Are we ready for TRR?

TRR readiness: GO WITH CONDITIONS (illustrative)

Requirements verified 362 of 496; evidence gaps 1; open NCRs 1; configuration mismatches 2; pending tests 2; cybersecurity findings 1; critical anomalies 0.

Gates already held

• MCR — GO. Mission need and optical EO concept agreed.
• SRR — GO. System requirements baselined; 14 TBDs assigned owners.
• SDR — GO. Architecture and allocation accepted; power margin action closed.
• PDR — GO. Six actions raised; all closed.
• CDR — GO WITH CONDITIONS. Waiver WVR-007 (radiator emissivity) approved and carried forward.
• SIR — GO. Two NCRs on incoming harnesses closed before integration.

Open items and their evidence traces

• ANM-0219 · Anomaly · from TRR · blocking from SARFSW-247 failed in hardware-in-the-loop test+−

  Safe-mode transition took 2.7 s against a 2 s requirement; corrective action implemented, retest pending.

  1. Subsystem: Flight Software
  2. Requirement FSW-247: Transition from NOMINAL to SAFE mode within 2 s of a watchdog timeout, preserving the last 60 s of housekeeping telemetry.
  3. Verification method: Test — hardware-in-the-loop (HIL)
  4. HIL test: HIL campaign C3 on the flat-sat, fault-injection case FI-12
  5. Test procedure: TP-FSW-118 Rev C · approved
  6. Applicable configuration: FSW build 4.2.0 · OBC engineering model S/N 002 (Rev D) · HIL simulator v3.1
  7. Test result: FAIL — transition 2.7 s; telemetry buffer truncated to 41 s
  8. Anomaly: ANM-0219 (major) — telemetry flush blocked the mode-manager task
  9. Corrective action: CA-0219 — flush moved to a low-priority task; FSW build 4.2.1
  10. Retest status: HIL retest C3-R on build 4.2.1 · scheduled, not yet run
  11. Verification closure: Open — awaiting retest evidence
  12. Authorized review: Not started — closure needs the flight software lead and the chief engineer

  Condition: HIL retest on build 4.2.1 passes before the TVAC functional sequence starts.

• TST-FSW-031 · Pending test · from TRR · blocking from SARHIL retest of FSW-247 on build 4.2.1+−

  Retest is scheduled before the TVAC functional sequence; its result closes ANM-0219.

  1. Requirement: FSW-247 — safe-mode transition within 2 s
  2. Driver: Corrective action CA-0219 (anomaly ANM-0219)
  3. Test procedure: TP-FSW-118 Rev C · unchanged, still applicable
  4. Configuration to test: FSW build 4.2.1 on OBC engineering model S/N 002
  5. Regression scope: Mode-manager and telemetry regression set (112 cases)
  6. Status: Scheduled · not yet run

  Condition: Run before the first TVAC functional test; results reviewed by the flight software lead.

• SAT-EPS-014 · Configuration mismatch · from TRR · blocking from SARBattery charge evidence produced on an earlier configuration+−

  Verified in June on BMS firmware 2.3.0 and PCB Rev B; both have since changed. Evidence validity: At Risk.

  1. Subsystem: Electrical Power (EPS)
  2. Requirement SAT-EPS-014 (Rev 3): Terminate battery charging at 4.10 V ±0.015 V per cell between 0 °C and 40 °C
  3. Verification method: Test — EPS functional test across temperature
  4. Evidence: TR-EPS-114 (June) · PASS at 4.102 V per cell
  5. Evidence configuration: Requirement Rev 2 · BMS FW 2.3.0 · PCB Rev B · ICD Rev C · TP-EPS-022 Rev A
  6. Changes since: Requirement Rev 3 · BMS FW 2.4.0 · PCB Rev C · ICD Rev D · TP-EPS-022 Rev B
  7. Evidence validity: At Risk — configuration no longer matches the baseline under review
  8. Engineering disposition: Reverification Required (delta analysis DA-EPS-009, EPS lead)
  9. Verification closure: Reopened

  Condition: Requirement reopened; evidence is not counted as verified until the delta test passes.

• TST-EPS-022 · Pending test · from TRR · blocking from SARDelta charge-termination test on BMS FW 2.4.0+−

  Reverification of SAT-EPS-014, planned in the TVAC functional sequence.

  1. Requirement: SAT-EPS-014 Rev 3
  2. Driver: Reverification required after BMS FW 2.4.0 and PCB Rev C
  3. Test procedure: TP-EPS-022 Rev B · approved
  4. Configuration to test: Flight battery assembly with BMS FW 2.4.0 · PCB Rev C
  5. Status: Planned in TVAC functional sequence

  Condition: Included in the TVAC functional sequence and reported before the hot plateau ends.

• CFG-ADCS-007 · Configuration mismatch · from TRR · blocking from SARStar tracker 2 replaced; test article list not updated+−

  Unit S/N 0031 swapped for S/N 0034 after a connector issue; the as-run configuration list still shows S/N 0031.

  1. Subsystem: ADCS
  2. Configuration item: Star tracker 2 · S/N 0031 → S/N 0034 (same part number and revision)
  3. Affected evidence: Alignment measurement AL-ADCS-004 recorded on S/N 0031
  4. Similarity rationale: Draft — same lot, acceptance data available for S/N 0034
  5. Test article configuration list: Update to Rev F pending
  6. Authorized review: Configuration manager and ADCS lead

  Condition: Test article configuration list updated to Rev F before the test starts.

• NCR-0142 · NCR · from TRR · blocking from SARHarness connector J12 backshell torque out of tolerance+−

  Dispositioned use-as-is by engineering; Material Review Board signature pending.

  1. Subsystem: Avionics & On-board Computer
  2. Requirement: AVI-HRN-033 — connector backshell torque per harness drawing
  3. Inspection: Torque audit during integration · 0.9 N·m measured vs 1.1 N·m minimum
  4. NCR: NCR-0142 raised
  5. Disposition: Use-as-is proposed: vibration margin analysis AN-STR-021 shows no loosening risk
  6. Material Review Board: Signature pending (quality and avionics lead)
  7. Closure: Open

  Condition: MRB signature obtained before the article enters the chamber.

• SEC-F-031 · Cybersecurity finding · from TRR · blocking from SARCommand authentication replay window+−

  Penetration test of the TT&C command path found a replay window; fix implemented in FSW 4.2.1, retest pending.

  1. Security requirement: SEC-012 — reject replayed or out-of-sequence telecommands
  2. Threat: Replay of captured telecommands on the S-band uplink
  3. Allocated control: Authenticated commands with a monotonic sequence counter
  4. Configuration: FSW build 4.2.0 · ground command encoder v1.8
  5. Verification method: Penetration test PT-02 on the flat-sat
  6. Finding: SEC-F-031 (medium) — counter accepted within a 30 s window after reset
  7. Remediation: Counter persisted across resets; FSW build 4.2.1
  8. Retest: PT-02 retest on build 4.2.1 · pending
  9. Authorized security review: Not started

  Condition: No uplink commanding outside the test procedure until the retest passes.

• EVG-SEC-004 · Evidence gap · from TRR · blocking from SARSBOM not regenerated for FSW build 4.2.1+−

  The software bill of materials on file describes build 4.2.0.

  1. Requirement: SEC-021 — maintain a software bill of materials for every flight build
  2. Evidence on file: SBOM for FSW build 4.2.0
  3. Current configuration: FSW build 4.2.1
  4. Gap: No SBOM or composition analysis for the current build

  Condition: SBOM for build 4.2.1 issued before the build is declared the flight candidate.

• EVG-THM-002 · Evidence gap · from SAR · blockingThermal model correlation report+−

  Model correlation against system TVAC results is needed before acceptance.

  1. Requirement: THM-001 — thermal design maintains all units within limits with 5 °C margin
  2. Verification method: Analysis, correlated by test
  3. Prerequisite: System TVAC results (this campaign)
  4. Evidence: Correlation report — not yet produced
• WVR-007 · Waiver · from SAR · blocking from FRRRadiator coating emissivity below specification+−

  Measured 0.86 against 0.88 required; accepted at CDR with analysis. Customer acceptance pending.

  1. Requirement: THM-014 — radiator emissivity ≥ 0.88
  2. Inspection: Emissivity measured 0.86 on coating batch B-3
  3. Waiver: WVR-007 · analysis shows margin retained with 0.86
  4. Internal approval: Approved at CDR by the chief engineer
  5. Customer acceptance: Pending
• EVG-PL-011 · Evidence gap · from SAR · blockingImager MTF evidence from engineering model only+−

  Modulation transfer function results exist for the engineering model; flight-model data is pending.

  1. Requirement: PL-006 — system MTF ≥ 0.12 at Nyquist
  2. Evidence on file: MTF test on engineering model EM-1
  3. Applicability: Engineering model optics differ from flight model in focal-plane mount
  4. Flight-model test: Planned after TVAC
• TST-COM-009 · Pending test · from ORR · blockingEnd-to-end RF compatibility with the ground station+−

  Not yet performed with the operational ground station.

  1. Requirement: COM-002 — TT&C link compatible with the operational ground network
  2. Verification method: Test — end-to-end RF compatibility
  3. Status: Scheduled after shipment to the launch site
• TST-SEC-012 · Pending test · from ORR · blockingGround segment penetration test+−

  Mission control and ground station interfaces not yet tested.

  1. Security requirement: SEC-030 — ground segment hardened per the mission security plan
  2. Verification method: Penetration test of mission control and station interfaces
  3. Status: Not yet performed
• EVG-STR-005 · Evidence gap · from FRR · blockingLaunch adapter fit check+−

  Mechanical fit check with the launch-vehicle adapter is planned at the launch site.

  1. Requirement: STR-040 — interface to the launch adapter per the launch-vehicle ICD
  2. Verification method: Inspection and fit check
  3. Status: Planned at the launch site
• EVG-COM-014 · Evidence gap · from MRR · blockingFrequency authorisation evidence not linked+−

  Spectrum and operating authorisation records are not yet linked to the mission readiness package.

  1. Requirement: MIS-009 — operate only under valid frequency and operating authorisations
  2. Evidence: Authorisation records held by the programme office, not yet linked

Evidence validity scenario (SAT-EPS-014)

1. 1. Current — TR-EPS-114 passes at 4.102 V per cell. The evidence and the baseline under review are the same configuration.
2. 2. Change detected — The battery management firmware moves to 2.4.0, the board to Rev C, the EPS–OBC interface to Rev D, the test procedure to Rev B, and the requirement tolerance is tightened in Rev 3.
3. 3. At Risk — The June evidence was produced on a configuration that no longer matches the baseline. AEAIP flags it; it does not delete or silently keep it.
4. 4. Reverification Required — Delta analysis shows the charge-termination logic changed in firmware 2.4.0, so the result cannot be retained by rationale. The requirement is reopened and a retest is planned.
5. 5. Current — reverified — TP-EPS-022 Rev B passes at 4.098 V per cell on BMS FW 2.4.0 and PCB Rev C. The June evidence is marked superseded and kept for history.